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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the court's decision in Gordon v. Elliman. By including an action to
compel the declaration of a dividend within the confines of Section
61-b, the court has taken away one more right of the stockholder.
Because of the inequitable results flowing from Section 61-b, one
would expect the Court of Appeals to strictly construe it; however,
it has adopted the opposite attitude. It appeared to go out of its way
to hold that this type of action was within the Legislature's intention
in enacting this section.
This case clearly illustrates the harshness and inequity of Sec-
tion 61-b, and the firmness with which it is now rooted in our law.
The remedy is in the Legislature. It is hoped that it will re-
evaluate its position on this matter, and by open hearings, 69 obtain
a solution that will both protect against "strike suits" and once more
return to the minority stockholder his right to effectively demand
fair treatment by the management.
M
THE ABUSE OF THE UNION WELFARE FUND--A PROPOSED
REMEDY
There is a great deal of difference between the collective bar-
gaining agreement of today and the bargaining agreement of yes-
terday. Whereas the latter merely concerned the negotiation of basic
standards of wages and hours, provision for the well-being of the
worker outside the factory is increasingly becoming part and parcel
of the modern collective bargaining agreement. This trend has led
to the establishment of union death and disability benefits commonly
referred to as "welfare funds." ' "The new point of view, namely,
that it is desirable and proper for a union to write a contract that
covers matters of health, welfare, vacation, retirement, in addition to
hours and wages, brought new problems with it in the administration
of such funds." 2 Of current national interest is the question of
whether or not these funds should be put under state or federal regu-
lation in order to prevent their dissipation through misappropriation
or sheer mismanagement.
69 One of the criticisms against the passage of Section 61-b was that it
was denied a public hearing. See Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders'
Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 148 (1944).
" Some union leaders look upon these funds with disfavor since they be-
lieve that a union's task is solely to concern itself with wages and hours.
2 See Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, 7 AmmIcAN FED-
ERATIONIST 10 (July 1954).
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Historical Background
The first union to make provision for the financial protection of
its members due to illness was the Journeymen Barbers, who intro-
duced such benefits in 1893. However, their plan and the ones
adopted shortly thereafter 3 did not function too smoothly.4  It also
appears that the welfare plans did not make much progress in the
labor movement as a whole. 5 The first collective bargaining agree-
ment establishing a health and welfare fund was signed in 1926 be-
tween the Newburgh (New York) Public Service Corporation and
the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Em-
ployees, American Federation of Labor.6 In 1938, Local 91 of the
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union negotiated a contract
in which the employers promised to contribute a percentage of their
payroll to a pooled fund, to be used to provide vacation pay for mem-
bers of the union. 7  Subsequently, employers in Philadelphia agreed
to extend the pooled fund plan to include health and welfare benefits.8
However, it is to be noted that the great majority of welfare plans
prior to World War II were financed through dues and assessments
of union members, and not through employer contributions.9 During
the war years, Executive Order 9250 and the Little Steel Formula
froze wages,10 and employers, in order to hold their labor force, de-
veloped a series of "fringe benefits." I" These benefits provided a
method of attracting and holding employees without the granting of
illegal wage increases. The National War Labor Board approved
the benefit plans 12 and permitted unions and employers to establish
group insurance and health and welfare plans, provided that the cost
of such plans did not exceed five per cent of the wages or salaries of
3 A welfare plan was set up by the Tobacco workers in 1896; the Pattern-
makers in 1898, and the Plumbers in 1903. See Held, Health and Welfare Funds
In The Needle Trades, 1 IND. & LABOR REL. REv. 247 (1948).
4 Ibid.
5 Statistics indicate that the total number of unions reporting payment of
sick benefits were: 28 in 1903; 27 in 1913; 30 in 1933, and 18 in 1943. Ibid.
6 See Sackman, Welfare Collective Bargainng In Action, NEw YORK
STATE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
RESEARCH BULL. No. 3 at 1 (1949).
7 See Held, supra note 3, at 249.
8 Ibid.
9 See Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, 7 AmERICAN FnE-
ERATIONIST 10 (July 1954).
10 See Sackman, supra note 6, at 1-2. (Wage increases were believed to be
inflationary, and thus were prohibited to safeguard the wartime economy.).
I1 Among these benefits were vacations, night shift bonuses, overtime and
health and welfare plans. Ibid.
12 See Gordon, Tax Effects of Union Welfare Funds, 6 TAX L. REv. 1 n.1
(1950). Thus millions of dollars, which under the wage freeze might have
become employers' profits, were diverted into union welfare funds.
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the employees."8 The establishment of these funds received further
impetus when the employers' contributions to such funds were class-
ified, for federal tax purposes, as a permissible business deduction.' 4
Soon, health and welfare funds were among the standard goals of all
unionized workers.
In 1938 the convention report of the American Federation of Labor showed
total benefit payments-covering death, sickness, old age, disability and mis-
cellaneous benefits--of some $25 million for all AFL affiliates.
Dramatic evidence of the growth in welfare funds is contained in the single
fact that in 1953 the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union paid out
benefits of more than $36 million and had an income of $54 million. This one
union in 1953 paid out more than the combined affiliates of the AFL did in
1938.15
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that nine to ten million em-
ployees are covered by some form of union welfare plan.16 The ad-
ministrators of these funds are believed to have more than twenty
billion dollars at their disposal.17 In 1953, in New York State alone,
365 million dollars were paid into union welfare funds covering an
estimated three million employees.' 8
Nature of the Funds
Today the majority of union welfare funds are employer con-
tributed, i.e., the employer pays a certain percentage of his payroll into
a fund administered by trustees for the benefit of the employees.' 9
13 See Sackman, Welfare Collective Bargaining It Action, NEw YoRK
STATE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS, CORNELL UNIVERSTY,
RESEARCH BULL. No. 3 at 2 (1949).
14 Ibid.
is Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, 7 AmERIcAN Fr.DEA-
TIONIST 10 (July 1954).
16 See Business Week, Feb. 13, 1954, p. 165, col. 1.
17 See U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, pp. 129-130.
18 See America, Apr. 10, 1954, p. 30, cols. 1-2.
19 "Health and welfare plans established by collective bargaining generally
follow these patterns:
"1. The fund is administered wholly by the employer with no union par-
ticipation. The collective bargaining agreement spells out the benefits to be
provided and the financing of the plan. The method of underwriting the
benefits and the cost of the program are left to the employers. In such cases,
employers almost always purchase their group insurance from private com-
mercial carriers and/or Blue Cross.
"2. The employer and union establish a fund administered either jointly
or by the union alone. This fund then purchases group insurance from private
carriers and/or Blue Cross. The collective bargaining agreement usually stip-
ulates the method of financing the plan and the method of administration
(selection of trustees, etc.). The determination of the amount of benefits to
be provided, and the rules of eligibility, are left to the trustees of the fund.
[ VOL. 29
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The fund itself has been described as a "beneficial charitable trust." 2 0
Employer contributions are tax deductible,2 ' while the trust fund as
such is tax exempt. 22 In Inland Steel Co.,23 it was held that it is an
unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the union on the issue of welfare funds. As a result of this
holding, welfare funds are a proper subject of collective bargaining
and employers must bargain, although they may not come to any
agreement concerning the establishment of a welfare plan.24 The Taft-
Hartley Act permits the investment of these funds,25 as well as the
making of reasonable loans to members of the union. 26 However, the
trust funds may only be used for the purpose for which they were in-
tended.27 It has been held that where the collective bargaining agree-
ment provides that the trustees shall receive the payments from the
employer and administer the fund according to rules which they shall
adopt, the title to the funds is in the trustees and not in the union.28
Mere authorization for the union, in its constitution or by-laws, to
participate in such a fund is not evidence of title to the fund.29 In
"3. The employer and union establish a self-insured fund through collec-
tive bargaining. This fund may be administered solely by the union or by the
union and employer jointly. This fund pays the benefits directly to the claim-
ants, though hospital and surgical benefits may be purchased from Blue Cross.
In this case, the collective bargaining agreement stipulates how the fund is to
be financed and the method of administration, leaving the determination of
benefits and rules for eligibility to the trustees of the fund." Sackman, Welfare
Collective Bargaining In Action, NEw YORK STATE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND
LABOR RELATIONS, CoRNE. UNVERsiTY, RESEARCH BULL. No. 3 at 3 (1949).
Two of the most Well known welfare plans are those of the United Mine
Workers and the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. For an in-
sight into the internal structure of the I.L.G.W.U. plan see Held, Health and
Welfare Funds in the Needle Trades, 1 IND. & LABOR REL. REv. 247 (1948).
20 Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D.D.C. 1948) ; "The treasurer
was not, in our view, the custodian of this fund merely as an officer of
that organization but he held it as a trustee solely for the benefit of the
members.. . ." Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 210 F2d 852, 857 (7th
Cir. 1954).
21 INT. REv. CODE § 404(a).
22 INT. REv. CODE § 501(a). However, the amount distributed to any bene-
ficiary is taxable to him. INT. REv. CODE § 402(a).
2377 N.L.R.B. 1, 36 (1948), enforcement granted sub no. Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
24 "The Board has frequently recognized that, as the Act does not require
final agreement or the granting of concessions, the parties may reach an impasse
which does not reflect on the good faith of the bargaining." National Maritime
Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 981 (1948).
25 United Garment Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 83 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa.
1949).
26 Ibid.27 See Suffidge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211, 217 (Sup. Ct. 1948).28 Matter of Townsend, 130 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
20 Id. at 330.
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Henshaw v. Lewis 3 0 the court reasoned that where the trust is vested
in designated individuals, they all form but one collective trustee, and
they must exercise jointly all those powers that call for their dis-
cretion and judgment, unless the trust instrument or declaration au-
thorizes an apportionment of powers. Therefore, New York courts
would not entertain a suit against the trust fund unless all the trustees
were personally served in New York, or the situs of the trust fund
was within the jurisdiction of the court.8 '
Present Regulation of Welfare Funds
Although unions are given a comparatively free hand in the run-
ning of their welfare funds, they have been subject to some degree
of restriction. The Taft-Hartley Act 32 requires that: (1) such pay-
ments are to be held in trust; (2) the detailed basis on which pay-
ments are to be made is to be specified in a written agreement with
the employer; (3) the employers and employees are to be equally
represented in the administration of these funds, together with such
neutral persons as these representatives may agree upon; (4) in the
event that the employer and employee groups deadlock on the admin-
istration of such fund, and there are no neutral persons empowered
to break the deadlock, such agreement shall provide that the two
groups agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in
the event of their failure to agree within a reasonable time, an im-
partial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group,
be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district
in which the trust fund has its principal office; (5) the agreement
shall contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a state-
ment of the results of which shall be available for inspection by in-
terested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such
other places as may be designated in the agreement; (6) payments
intended to be used to provide pensions or annuities for employees
are to be kept in a separate trust, and the funds held therein cannot
be employed for any purpose other than the payment of such pensions
or annuities; (7) any person who wilfully violates any of the fore-
going provisions shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be subject to
a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or to imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both. However, the number of welfare
funds covered by the terms of the Taft-Hartley Act is rather limited.
First, the Act does not apply to unions whose activities do not affect
interstate commerce.3 3 Therefore, many of the welfare funds of local
30 118 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub norn. Kane v. Lewis, 282 App.
Div. 529, 125 N.Y.S.2d 544 (3d Dep't 1953).
31 Ibid.
3261 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §186 (1952).
33 See Gordon, Tax Effects of Union Welfare Funds, 6 TAx L. Rv. 1, 4(1950).
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unions are not within the scope of the statute. Secondly, the Act
specifically exempts from its purview all contributions to trust funds
established by collective agreement prior to January 1, 1946.34 This
exemption has been construed to mean that welfare funds established
before 1946 are without the scope of the statute, even though the
employer only began to contribute to the fund subsequent to 1946.35
Some limitations have been placed on welfare fund activity
by decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. Despite
earlier decisions to the contrary,36 the Board has recently held that
collective bargaining agreements limiting welfare benefits to union
members, without fulfilling the statutory requirements on the closed
shop agreement, violate the Taft-Hartley Act.37 A similar decision
was reached in the Jandel Furs case.38
The Jandel case held that both the employer and the union committed un-
fair labor practices by providing in the collective bargaining agreement that
participation in the welfare fund should be limited to members of the union.
The employer was found guilty of committing unfair labor practices because
the illegal contract clause violated Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act by interfering with, restraining and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the act (which protects
the right of employees to engage in or to refrain from engaging in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection) ; violated Section &(a) (2) by encour-
aging membership in and contributing support to a union; and violated Sec-
tion 8(a) (3) by discriminating against nonunion employees. The union was
found guilty of violating Section 8(b) (1) (A), the counterpart of Section
8(a) (1), and of violating Section 8(b) (2), the counterpart of Section
8(a) (3).39
When the remedy for the illegal exclusion of nonmembers of a union from
a welfare fund is considered in its broadest aspects, the explosive nature of
the holding in Jandel Furs becomes evident. The Board's discretion in fash-
ioning any remedy which will effectuate the purpose of the act has been almost
unfettered in the courts.4 0
Another source of regulation has been judicial intervention. The
power of the courts to prevent or rectify misappropriation or miscon-
duct on the part of union officials has long been recognized. 41 The
4 61 STAT. 157(g) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(g) (1952).
35 Fur Dressers Union v. Fur Dressers Guild, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 400
(S.D. N.Y. 1949).
36 See, e.g., Upholsterers' International Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co.,
82 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
7 Penello v. International Union, United Mine Worl~ers, 88 F. Supp. 935
(D.D.C. 1950).
38 100 N.L.RtB. 1390 (1952).
39 See Katz and Jaffe, Illegal Pension and Welfare Funds, 4 LABOR L.J. 13
(1953).
4 0 d. at 16.
41 For the procedure by which a member of the union may sue in its behalf
see Perkins, Protection of Labor Union Funds by Members' Representative
Suits-Massachusetts Practice, 27 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1947).
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courts have recently expanded the application of this power to in-
clude welfare fund abuses.
Union welfare or trust funds, as far as case law is concerned, is some-
thing new in the law. Despite the rarity of decisions involving them however,
the benign light in which the courts will view them has already appeared on
the horizon. As seen in United Garment Workers of America v. Jacob Reed's
Sons . . . "[t]he Court considers such funds as rather sacred, and it is the
purpose of the law that they be available when due under the contract." There-
fore, whenever the trustees use, or attempt to use, directly or indirectly, the
fund for a purpose other than for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employee-
members, this court, when called upon, will enjoin the trustees from making
the improper expenditure. The burdening of the fund with undue administra-
tive expenses or lush salaries for union officials will not be tolerated; excessive
restrictions, either in the insurance policies or the by-laws and regulations, or
the providing of small benefits to the employee-members in proportion to the
amount contributed . . . or the premiums paid, taking into consideration the
risk involved, will cause more than a lifting of the eyebrows. A provision in
the by-laws or regulations denying the employee-members the right to resort
to the courts to protect their beneficial interest in the fund is of no legal effect. 42
One such instance of an individual union member invoking the aid of
the courts in order to protect his interest in the fund is found in
Forrish v. Kennedy.43 There the trustees were ordered to grant the
plaintiff the pension they were wrongfully withholding. The trustees
had denied the plaintiff's claim that he was among the class of those
entitled to a pension, and maintained that under the terms of the
pension plan they had sole discretion in the matter. Nevertheless,
the court held that, although it could not control the trustees' dis-
cretion, it could compel them to exercise it in good faith and within
the bounds of reasonable judgment.
A minor source of regulation has been union self-discipline. In
some local unions, the constitution or by-laws provide for superin-
tendence or inspection of the welfare fund on the part of the inter-
national union. An illustration of the parent union policing the
welfare activities of its locals is presented by the International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union. The I.L.G.W.U.'s system combines local
control of the 124 separate funds with supervision on the part of
the International.
The key to the proper policing of these funds lies in the international
union's practice of auditing the local's books. This right of the international
union to audit the books of the locals goes back many years in ILGWU. The
auditing of the local books-including the local health and welfare and retire-
ment funds-by a well-trained corps of international auditors is the key to
vigilant policing.
42 Upholsterers' International Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F.
Supp. 570, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
43377 Pa. 370, 105 A.2d 67 (1954).
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A companion to our international audit is the publication by the inter-
national of the full financial facts about the welfare funds administered by
locals and joint boards. How much received? How much paid out? And
how much towards administrative costs?
It is with respect to this last item-administrative costs-often cover-
ing a variety of strange practices, that publication of the thoroughly audited
facts will check many abuses.44
The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union also provides
for approval of all plans by the health and welfare committee of the
International. The union's constitution requires the separation of
welfare funds from other accounts of the union; regulates the se-
curities in which the union may invest and limits the administrative
costs to five per cent of the contributions to the fund for the current
year.45 Although this union presents a picture of strong control of
local welfare funds on the part of the International, in actual fact,
many internationals have little, if any, control over the affairs of their
locals. The latter oppose any attempted regulation on the part of
internationals, fearing that regulation will give way to loss of local
autonomy.46 Consequently, the internationals are now of little value
as a check on the local's welfare activities.
Abuse of Welfare Funds
The abuse of welfare funds on a national level is small com-
pared to the abuse on the local level. This is so because the funds
usually remain on the local plane and are not passed up to the higher
organizations in the union. Although most of the misappropriation
takes the form of "padded administration costs," the ways and means
of exploiting the funds are numerous and sundry, limited only by the
imagination of the individual manipulator. Some of the more common
methods employed are:
(a) Union officials use the position of welfare administrator
as a source of patronage. Some relative or associate is placed in
charge of the fund. The office is staffed with other relatives
and friends, all drawing large salaries. 47  Sometimes the union
officials receive two salaries, one from the union and one from
the welfare fund.
(b) An outside agency is set up to handle the administra-
tion of the welfare fund. Once again, friends or relatives are
put in charge. The outside agency charges the union a fee for
44 Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, 7 AmmucAN FunFaA-
TIONIST 10, 12 (July 1954).
4 Ibid.
46 See Dubinsky, supra note 44, at 12; 77 MONTHLY LABOR REv. 441 (1954).
47 See U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, pp. 132-133.
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administering the fund, and also receives a commission from
the insurance company for placing the fund's business with that
particular insurance company.48
(c) The fund administrators follow a practice known as
"switching" insurance companies.49 Since the insurance com-
panies wish to attract the unions' multi-million dollar business,
they offer exorbitant commissions to anyone who will secure the
business for them. However, the commissions are greatest in
the first year and diminish every year thereafter. Accordingly,
many labor officials make it a practice to change their insurance
companies every year in order to take advantage of the abnor-
mally high first year commission rates. A little reflection dis-
closes the fact that the cost of these high commissions is eventu-
ally borne by the welfare fund itself. The insurance company
pays the commissions, secures the union's business, and then
passes the cost along to the fund in the form of smaller benefits.
The union is getting less in return for its premiums than it nor-
mally would if the high commissions were not paid out. This
nefarious practice induces the administrators to shop around for
the insurance company paying the highest commission rather
than the company giving the most benefits for the lowest
premium.
Fraud on a smaller scale is perpetrated through gifts and annu-
ities to welfare officials, high salaries, vacations at welfare expense, etc.
Contributing Factors to the Growth of Abuse
The dissipation of welfare funds through fraud and mismanage-
ment has only recently come to the attention of the public. However,
the factors contributing to the inception and spread of these abuses
have been at work for over a decade. Had these factors not been
operative, the evils now coming to light would have been kept to a
minimum if not prevented altogether. The five major causes of the
abuses under consideration may be briefly summarized as follows:
1. The employers' indifference to the management of these
funds: Although the Taft-Hartley Act requires the employers to
have an equal voice in the management of these funds,50 few em-
ployers take an active interest in their administration. The same is
true on the local level where the Taft-Hartley Act dual-management
principle is not controlling. The motivating force behind this neglect
of duty is the widespread feeling among the employers that the wel-
48 See Dubinsky, supra note 44, at 11; Fortune, Apr. 1954, p. 142, col. 1.
49 Ibid.
5061 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952).
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fare plans are a form of "pay" and hence belong to the employees
and should be looked after by the employees. 51 As far as the em-
ployers are concerned, they will be required to pay the same amount
into an honest welfare fund as into a dishonest one. Therefore, there
is no reason why they should worry about fraud and mismanagement.
The end result of the absenteeism of the employer-trustees is to give
the union-trustees a free hand. That, in turn, encourages fraud.5 2
2. The employees' disinterest in the funds' management: For-
merly, when the welfare funds were employee-contributed, the em-
ployees kept a close watch on their administration.5 3  Today, how-
ever, with the contributions coming from outside sources, the em-
ployees tend to "let things ride" as long as things are running
smoothly. This breakdown in union democracy is reflected in statis-
tics which indicate that the normal attendance at union meetings is
about tvo to eight per cent of union membership.54  Thus, the affairs
of the union are left in the hands of a few. The importance of this
concentration of power is illustrated by the fact that the same people
who negotiate for the funds naturally tend to control them.55
3. Union leaders cementing themselves into their jobs: Cor-
respondingly, as union democracy declined, the self-perpetuation in
office on the part of union officials increased.56 This removed the
check on union officials' activities formerly supplied by the turnover
of union officers.5 7
51 See Business Week, Feb. 13, 1954, p. 166, col. 1; Fortune, Apr. 1954,
p. 142, col. 1.
2An example of the lax supervision of these funds by the employers was
disclosed in a recent investigation which brought out the fact that minutes of
the annual meeting of a welfare fund board (composed of three employers and
three union members) were typed in advance, always including a statement
that the board found "everything satisfactory." The investigation also showed
that the funds were being depleted via high salaries taken by the administrators.
See U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, p. 132, col. 1.
53 See Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, 7 AmERIcAN FED-
ERATIONIsT 10 (July 1954).
54 See Strauss and Sayles, The Local Union Meeting, 6 IND. & LABOR PEL.
REV. 206, 209 (1953). A survey of a union in the steel industry having a mem-
bership of 14,000, revealed that, apart from the 36 officers of the local, only 89
members bothered to come to 4 or more meetings a year. See Business Week,
June 2, 1951, p. 31, col. 1.
55 See U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, pp. 130-131.
56 In one fund belonging to an American Federation of Labor affiliate, the
administration was placed in the hands of the local's vice-president. He then
negotiated an agreement giving him the job of administering the fund for life,
with a salary of ten per cent of all fund contributions, plus two per cent for
expenses. In another union the executive board adopted a resolution giving
the president and secretary-treasurer successive ten year terms, with a two-thirds
vote of the local's membership necessary to oust them from their positions.
See U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, pp. 130-131.
57 "The top leadership has also fought to maintain itself in office. The
present-day emoluments of office simply make the fight more intense. The im-
1954]
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4. Insurance companies closing their eyes to the long range
implications of the excessive commissions they have been paying:
Since much of the misuse of funds has taken place in the area of
"placing the insurance," the insurance companies have much to an-
swer for.58 Had the companies refrained from paying exorbitant
commissions and other questionable practices, a good deal of the
"milking" of the funds would not have taken place.
5. Mismanagement due to the lack of specialized knowledge
necessary to run the funds efficiently: The comparative newness of
the welfare funds, as well as their vastness, have been contributing
factors in the dissipation of the funds. Union leaders, unaware of
the necessity for skilled insurance training, have attempted to estab-
lish and administer the funds themselves.5 9 Their inexperience has
proven very costly to the funds. In a recent examination of 145 such
funds, twenty-one were found to be badly mismanaged, while forty-one
others were criticized. 60
Labor's Attempts to Clean Its Own House
Several attempts have been made recently, on the part of labor
leaders, to remedy the abuses in order to ward off government con-
trol. Mr. David Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, has put forth a twofold program.6' He
advocates supervision of local welfare funds by the international, and
cooperation with the legislatures in order to secure minimum stan-
dards for their administration, rather than far-reaching government
regulation. The C.I.O. Executive Board recently established a stand-
ing committee "to investigate any charges or allegations of mal-
administration of welfare or other funds within the CIO." Similarly,
the American Federation of Labor National Executive Council has
called on its affiliates to set up rules and regulations to govern such
funds for the protection of their members. 62 On the local level, the
proved financial rewards have not only made leadership more attractive; they
have made it more secure. In its power over appointments and its control over
investments, leadership has two potent weapons for entrenchment and
aggrandizement." Ginzberg, American Labor Leaders: Time In Office, 1 IND.
& LABOR REL. REv. 283, 293 (1948).
58 See Business Week, Feb. 13, 1954, p. 168, col. 1.
59 An illustration of a basic error on the part of welfare fund administrators
is the tendency to adopt the financial set-ups of the larger, more successful
unions. This usually invites disaster, as the smaller funds become depleted due
to failure to anticipate the correspondingly higher administrative costs involved
in a smaller union.
6o See U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, p. 129, col. 2.
61 See Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, 7 AmERICAN FED-
ERATIONIST 10 (July 1954).
62 See Business Week, Feb. 13, 1954, p. 165, col. 2.
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New York City American Federation of Labor Central Trades and
Labor Council in mid-February created a board of inquiry to inves-
tigate the funds, with the primary objective of drafting "ethical and
economic standards" for their management.6 The Council has set
up a three-man commission assisted by advisory experts and an ac-
counting and clerical staff. The above-mentioned remedies offered
by union officials will be of some value if they serve to foster the
reawakening of union democracy and self-regulation. However, it
is seriously doubted that they will be able to stave off the all but
inevitable statutory regulation.
Current Investigations by Federal and State Governments
The recent exposes in the field of welfare funds have caused
much concern, and have given rise to a demand for regulation of these
funds. Investigations are underway in five states 64 as well as in
the House of Representatives 65 and the Senate.66 The investigation
in New York State is being conducted by the State Superintendent
of Insurance. Up to the present time in New York, unions were not
subject to the state Insurance Law.67 Therefore, a special statute 68
was passed in order to facilitate the inspection of these funds by the
Department of Insurance.69 Under its terms, the Superintendent
may examine the affairs of any welfare fund as often as he deems
expedient, but at least once every five years. The trustees are required
to maintain accurate records and accounts in conformance with gen-
erally accepted accounting practices. This inquiry, as well as the
investigations conducted by the other states and congressional com-
mittees, will seek to ascertain whether the abuses are so widespread
as to require regulation by law. Their reports and recommendations
will largely determine the nature and scope of the controls to be
imposed.
Conclusion
The publicity attendant upon these evils has helped popularize
the belief that today the unions, and not management, present the
63 See 77 MONTHLY LABOR RFv. 441 (1954).
64 New York, California, Illinois, Missouri and New Jersey. See Time,
Feb. 22, 1954, p. 100.
65 The House Committee on Education and Welfare has appointed an eight-
man subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Representative Samuel K.
McConnell, Jr. of Pennsylvania, to study union welfare activities.66 An investigation of welfare funds has been begun by the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, under the chairmanship of Senator Irving M.
Ives of New York.
67 N.Y. INS. LAW §466(1) (a).
68 Laws of N.Y. 1954, c. 278.
69 Under N.Y. INs. LAw § 466(3), the Superintendent had power to inves-
tigate, but solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the union
merited an exemption from the Insurance Law.
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greatest threat to labor.70  Several proposals have been made which
would subject labor unions to strict regulation. 71 For example, com-
pulsory incorporation of unions has been advocated in some quarters.72
But a state statute requiring such incorporation has been declared un-
constitutional as denying to unincorporated unions, and their indi-
vidual members, the right to function to promote their common wel-
fare by lawful means.73 Another solution that has been offered is
the establishment of a new administrative agency to supervise the
internal affairs of unions. 74 However, each of these suggested rem-
edies presents a danger, in that there would be a measurable increase
in government control over labor, particularly federal control.
Since the problem is both local and national it appears that fed-
eral and state regulation are necessary if the evil is to be effectively
combated. The Federal Government's power to regulate unions
whose activities seriously affect interstate commerce is little ques-
tioned.75 The state governments may exercise their police power to
control union activities as long as the regulations imposed do not
conflict with the Constitution or existing federal legislation.76  How-
ever, it is felt that statutory control of labor should be kept to a
minimum, and wherever possible, left to the state government.
In recent years there has been a growing tendency to look upon
union activity as being "quasi public" in nature and therefore subject
to governmental regulation. Another indication of impending regu-
lation of labor is found in recent decisions which treat collective bar-
gaining and other rights of unions as being dependent upon the will
70 "It would seem that the public should have as great an interest in the
protection of labor from labor, as in the protection of labor from capital."
Hamilton v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 262 S.W.2d 695, 700(Ky. 1953).
71 For a comprehensive treatment of some of the recent proposals for the
regulation of internal union matters see Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regu-
lation of Internal Union Affairs-II, 44 ILL. L. REv. 631 (1949).
72 See Unkovic, Should Labor Unions Be Incorporated?, 45 DIcK. L. REv.
23, 32 (1940).
73 See American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145(1944). See discussion of this case in 58 HARv. L. Rav. 1256 (1945).
74 See Smedley, A Plan for Union Democracy, 5 LABOR. L.J. 337, 339 (1954).
75 "It is too well known to require citation of authority that the sovereign
may regulate activities charged with a public interest, and may prescribe the
qualifications of the persons engaged in these activities." National Maritime
Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 173 (D.D.C.), aff'd I en., 334
U.S. 854 (1948).
76 "For the same reasons, the National Labor Relations Act does not pre-
clude a state from requiring a labor union, or its officers and agents, as such,
to procure licenses or make reports or perform other duties which do not ma-
terially obstruct the exercise of rights conferred by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act or other federal legislation." Chief Justice Stone, concurring in
I-Ell v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 545 (1945).
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of Congress and federal statutes.77 The ease with which the govern-
ment could dominate the labor field is illustrated by the cases of
United States v. United Mine Workers of America,78 and Linehan v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.79 In the Mine
Workers case, the Supreme Court held that the miners became gov-
ernment employees when the government seized the mines, and could
be enjoined from striking, since the Norris-La Guardia Act did not
apply to the Federal Government. The constitutional rights of both
the union and the individual employees were swept away by means
of government seizure.80 In the Waterfront Commission case, the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of a bi-state agreements' giving
a commission power to register dock laborers and to deny registration
to all those who, in the discretion of the commission, were thought
to be a danger to the public peace and safety. In the last analysis,
this enactment sets up a commission to determine who shall and who
shall not work.
Welfare funds are in a precarious position since they are falling
into the pattern followed by these last mentioned activities immedi-
ately prior to governmental intervention and control. In each, the
sequence of abuse, adverse publicity, public indignation and eventual
regulation is clearly discernible. What must be avoided, however,
is the sweeping control imposed in the former cases, with consequent
union subjection and loss of individual freedom. The forthcoming
legislation should seek to strike a balance by limiting the abuse with-
out an appreciable increase in the power concentrated in the Federal
Government.
Suggested Provision for Regulatory Legislation
(1) The federal statute should contain a clear expression on the
part of Congress that it does not intend to pre-empt the field and
thereby foreclose state regulation of welfare funds.
77 See, e.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, supra note 76; National Mari-
time Union of America v. Herzog, supra note 75 at 161.
78330 U.S. 258 (1947).
711116 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 439 (1954).
80 "At a time when government enterprise and government intervention in
business and industry inevitably are bound to increase, the Court has refused
to recognize that government employees have any constitutional rights which
the Court need protect. The long fight of labor to secure recognition of its
rights to carry on the struggle with capital 'in a fair and equal way' comes to
naught in the shadow of the sovereign. A more undemocratic result in a world
desperately in need of democracy could hardly be imagined." Watt, The Divine
Right of Government By Judiciary, 14 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 409, 453 (1947).
81 Laws of N.Y. 1953, cc. 882, 883; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 32:23-1
et seq. (Supp. 1953). Congressional consent was given in 67 STAT. 541 (1953).
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(2) State statutes should provide:
(a) That fund administrators shall keep accurate books
and accounts of all finances, including a breakdown of adminis-
trative costs, commissions received, etc.
(b) That a financial report shall be filed with the state de-
partment of labor each year, and that such report shall be pub-
lished for the information of the union membership.
(c) That the books of the fund may be audited, by the
proper state authorities, as often as deemed necessary, but at
least once every two years.
(d) That the financial structure of welfare plans shall be
subject to the approval of the state department of insurance.
This provision will aid in preventing the waste brought about
by the adoption of ill-advised welfare plans.
(e) That fund administrators shall be elected or appointed
for a period of no longer than four years. However, this pro-
vision should not be so worded as to prohibit the re-election or
reappointment of administrators, since experience may be a valu-
able asset to the proper administration of these funds.
(f) A comprehensive prohibition against anyone with a
criminal record having any connection with the administration
of these funds.
(g) Heavy criminal penalties for the misappropriation of
welfare funds.
Legislation intended to bring about an improvement in the moral
standards prevalent in labor unions will be successful, therefore,
primarily to the extent that it has the effect of inducing union mem-
bers themselves to return morality to the labor field through the
rebirth of union democracy.
It is generally agreed that trade union democracy cannot be achieved by
a government fiat. Model union constitutions have not always prevented despotic
rule by union officers, and there is little reason to hope that statutory require-
ments could not similarly be subverted as a result of hostility, indifference or
fear on the part of a union's membership, coupled with action on the part of
its leaders in violation of the letter and spirit of the law. 8 2
The power and influence of unions today carry with them the responsi-
bility to maintain a democratic administration of their own internal affairs.
Most unions recognize this obligation, but a significant minority do not. Ade-
quate remedies for abuses of union power are not presently available to union
members or would-be-members, either at common law or under existing state
82 Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I,
44 ILL. L. Rv. 631, 635 (1949).
[ VOL. 29
NOTES
and federal legislation. The enactment of minimal federal legislation regulat-
ing internal union affairs is therefore desirable. Such legislation should be
designed, not only to afford adequate relief against abuses of union power, but
also to encourage and assist unions to improve their own self-government.
8 3
)X
REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION OF CHURCHES
Introduction
The power to tax is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.' In
the United States it is vested exclusively in the legislative branch of
government unless limited by constitutional provision.2  Incidental
to this power is the power to exempt, and, in the absence of constitu-
tional prohibition, its exercise is essentially a question of a choice of
policy. In response to the will of the people, this legislative discretion
has traditionally been resolved in favor of exempting the real property
of religious institutions from taxation.
At the present time thirty-three state constitutions contain pro-
visions pertaining to this type of exemption. In eighteen constitutions
these provisions are mandatory; 3 in fourteen they are permissive; 
4
and the remaining one contains a combination of both features.
Jurisdictions which lack specific constitutional authorization grant
like exemption by general legislation.6 It has long been settled that
83 Id. at 674.
' See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 366 (1939) ; Transportation Co.
v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 281 (1878); The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall.
206, 226 (U.S. 1873) ; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 429 (U.S. 1819).
2 See People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 426 (1851);
see also Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515 (1880).
3 AL. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 91; ARK. CoNsT. Art. 16, § 5; CAL. CONST. Art.
XIII, § 1Y2; FLA. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 16; KAN. CoNsT. Art. 11, § 1; Ky.
CoNsr. § 170; LA. CONsT. Art X, § 4; MINN. CONsT. Art. 9, § 1; N.J. CoNsT.
Art. 8, § 1, j 2; N.M. CoNsT. Art. 8, § 3; N.Y. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 1; N.D.
CoNsT. Art. XI, § 176; OKLA. CONST. Art. X, §6; S.C. CoNsr. Art. 10, §4;
S.D. CoNsT. Art. XI, § 6; UTAH CONST. Art. XIII, § 2; VA. CoNsT. Art.
XIII, § 183; Wyo. CoNsT. Art. 15, § 12.
4A~iz. CONsT. Art. 9, § 2; GA. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 2-5404; IL.. CoNsr.
Art. IX, § 3; InD. CoNsr. Art. 10, § 1; Mo. CONST. Art. X, § 6; MONT. CONsT.
Art. XII, § 2; Nan. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 2; NEv. CONST. Art. VIII, § 132;
N.C. CON sT. Art. 5, § 5; OHIO CoNsT. Art XII, § 2; PA. CoNsT. Art. 9, § 1;
TENN. CONsT. Art. 2, § 28; TEx. CONsT. Art. VIII, § 2; W. VA. CoNsT.
Art. X, § 1.
5 CoLo. CoNsr. Art. 10, § 5.
6 CONN. GmN. STAT. §§ 1761(11), 1763 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9,§ 8103 (1953) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2) (Supp. 1953) ; IowA CODE c. 427,§427.1(9) (1949); ME. REV. STAT. c. 81, §6(V) (1944), as amended, Laws
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